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4Professor Hockett
Late in September 2008, the Bush Treasury 
ﬁ rst projected the plan we’re now living with 
as a “buy-up” of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) said to be clogging the credit markets. 
The Treasury next began speaking, in mid-
October 2008, of “buying-in” to ﬁ nancial 
institutions. By early November, the Treasury 
had announced that the “buy-in” plan would 
entirely supplant the earlier “buy-up” plan. 
About mid-November, however, the Treasury 
announced it would enter the short-term
debt markets as well. Then, near the end of 
that month, the plan changed again when
the Treasury announced it would resume 
purchasing “toxic” assets, but more than just 
MBSs. The term “erratic,” it seemed, could
be used to describe more than presidential 
candidates.
by  R O B E R T  C .  H O C K E T T
After a number of heady false starts, against the backdrop of threatened ﬁ nancial
catastrophe, Congress and the White House enacted a stopgap ﬁ nancial “bailout” 
plan early in October 2008. From that point onward the “plan” has repeatedly morphed, 
morphed again, and morphed back through a string of remarkably ﬂ eeting guises. 
One suspects this dynamic will continue, at least for a while, as a new president and 
Congress ﬁ nd their footing in the ﬁ rst half of 2009.
Throughout all the abrupt changes of 
direction, a few voices, softer than Treasury’s, 
persistently offered proposals geared toward 
the actual primary cause of our present 
ﬁ nancial worries—the ongoing mortgage 
foreclosure crisis afﬂ icting our post-bubble 
real estate markets. With time and continued 
tumult, these proposals have gradually 
gained a hearing. Now it is not only Sheila 
Bair, of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), but even Ben Bernanke, 
at the Federal Reserve, who can be added to 
the small, growing list of those focusing on 
the mortgage foreclosures that lie at the core 
of our woes.
It is good news that many are at last looking 
for solutions to the foreclosure crisis as the 
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turn, because they were imprudently or
in some cases “predatorily” ﬁ nanced by a 
shadow industry of scarcely regulated 
“mortgage banks.” These institutions, which 
are not actually banks at all—they take no 
deposits and are accordingly not regulated as 
depository institutions—sprang up and grew 
rapidly with our recent real estate bubble, 
indeed helping to fuel it. Naïve and in some 
cases even uncreditworthy borrowers not 
only received loans from these institutions, 
but were lured with offers of low front-end 
“teaser” payments that later “ballooned.”
While ordinarily lenders would not have 
found this a proﬁ table practice, bubbles have 
a funny way of changing people’s calculations. 
Borrowers not unreasonably assume they can 
reﬁ nance inexpensively on the strength of the 
underlying collateral’s apparently inexorable 
appreciation. Primary and secondary lenders 
naturally assume likewise and convince 
borrowers of the same, lured by the returns 
on investments that are there to be had 
during any bubble. For a time in such cases—
typically a decade or so at most—everyone 
wins. But bubbles have a way of bursting too. 
And when they do, the erstwhile winners 
who have not left the ship go down with it. 
The housing price slump that commenced in
mid-2006 quickly threw ill-structured, bubble-
vintage mortgages into default, threatening 
homeowners and creditors alike.
The second component of our mortgage-
rooted ﬁ nancial crisis is derivative and 
psychological: something much like the pro-
verbial “market for lemons,” known to 
macroeconomists since at least the time of 
Akerloff’s and Stiglitz’s canonical articles of 
the early 1970s (for which both won Nobel 
Prizes), follows many a burst bubble. In the 
present iteration of this all too familiar story, 
no institution knows what portion of its own 
MBS-holdings will prove underperforming
in consequence of the mortgage industry’s 
post-crash troubles. That is partly because
no one knows how low property values will
fall. And it is partly because property values, 
hence mortgage, hence MBS values are 
themselves partly determined by whatever 
action we collectively take or do not take to 
prevent defaults. There is an element of self-
fulﬁ lling prophecy in whatever we do here.
I am referring to the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), working in tandem 
with entities originally conceived of as its 
sibling organizations. These entities include 
the government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which 
were recently refederalized. Any properly 
focused plan for ﬁ nancial bailout will critically 
involve these institutions’ original, and 
recently restored, bailiwick.
To see why and how this is so, begin with a 
brief refresher on the cause of the problems 
we currently face. Economists generally agree 
that there are two particularly important 
components of the present crisis. The core 
component is the doubtful value of an un-
certain number of “subprime” MBSs. These 
are held in varying quantities by a large 
number of ﬁ nancial institutions all over the 
world. The securities are widely understood 
to be “toxic” because many—but not all
and not even a majority —of the mortgages 
backing them are troubled.
best means of addressing the present ﬁ nancial 
crisis. However badly the Treasury’s $700 
billion “transfusion” might have been needed 
to keep alive the “patients” that are our 
national and global ﬁ nancial systems, the fact 
is that those patients—or the public ﬁ sc—will 
continue to hemorrhage until we end the 
wave of foreclosures that is still underway. 
The only real question is how best to do that.
A brief bit of forgotten institutional history 
supplies our answer. The best way to solve 
the mortgage crisis, and thereby a looming 
national and indeed global ﬁ nancial crisis as 
well, is to instruct the Treasury to work 
through twinned institutions we already have. 
These both originally were, and still are, 
designed to deal efﬁ ciently with low-end 
mortgage ﬁ nance and reﬁ nance. Indeed they 
were founded precisely to deal with a real 
estate crisis that immediately preceded and 
led to (one shudders to say it) a notorious 
Wall Street contraction that commenced in 
October of 1929. Our present woes, moreover, 
stem directly from under-regulated private 
ﬁ rms intruding upon these institutions’ orig-
inal missions during the decade-long housing 
bubble that ran from 1996 through 2006.
As originally envisaged 
by the Treasury, we
purchase, through the 
newly refederalized 
GSEs, the “toxic”
MBSs from  key
ﬁ nancial institutions
 now holding them.
The self-fulﬁ lling prophecy part of the story 
radiates outward. The market grows ever 
more jittery over the uncertainties. The longer 
the jitters endure, the more prone investors 
become to undervalue affected ﬁ nancial insti-
tutions’ portfolios, hence stocks. The more 
investors shed their stakes in these institutions, 
the more quickly the remaining such stakes 
lose their short-run values. With institutions 
interlinked by collateralized debt obligations, 
credit-default swaps, and other derivative 
risk-sharing arrangements, even those not 
holding MBSs are ultimately affected. The 
familiar “downward spiral” and “widening 
gyre” of all ﬁ nancial crises ensues. But what 
goes down can be turned back up, or at any 
rate stabilized.
Enter here the FHA and its GSE siblings. We 
can quickly reverse the widening downward 
spiral, as the Treasury’s original plan of late 
September 2008 contemplates, by directly 
addressing the cause at its core—the bad 
mortgages and the securities they back. This 
is precisely what the FHA and the GSEs 
originally were and still are for. The Treasury 
should be instructed to work through them. 
Here is how.
As originally envisaged by the Treasury, 
purchase, through the newly refederalized 
GSEs, the “toxic” MBSs from key ﬁ nancial 
institutions now holding them. Pay more 
than currently undervalued market value,
but less than discounted cashﬂ ow value. The 
expenditure will then be recouped when
the full portfolio of MBSs rises back to its true 
value. Finally, ensure that ﬁ nancial institu-
tions that overinvested in MBSs incur some 
cost, hence avoiding moral hazard concerns.
Will the MBSs rise back to higher values?
Yes, for two reasons. The ﬁ rst is rooted in the 
“market for lemons” and “self-fulﬁ lling 
prophecy” phenomena. The problem in this 
case is that, while we know only a minority of 
MBSs are actually “toxic,” we don’t know 
which ones. During those periods of irrational 
despair that follow periods of irrational 
exuberance, individuals irrationally fear they 
hold toxic investments disproportionately.
(“I must have the bad ones.”) Fearing this 
individually, they then in effect make it so 
collectively, by stampeding to sell what they 
irrationally undervalue. Concentrate owner-
ship of the full affected portfolio, then, and 
you solve this collective action problem. 
You’ll restore real portfolio value, pocketing 
the difference between that and the current 
irrationally depressed market value.
The second and complementary part of the 
plan is simultaneously to arrange reﬁ nancing 
and ﬁ nancial counseling, through the FHA, 
for those mortgagees who are now going 
under owing to poorly structured or mis-
leadingly packaged mortgages. This can be 
done at a reasonable pace once the FHA’s 
sibling GSEs own the MBSs per the ﬁ rst part 
of the plan. The newly renationalized GSEs 
do not face the same ﬁ nancial imperatives
as private lenders. (Debt workouts too are 
familiarly a collective action problem, as any 
bankruptcy expert can attest.) This is yet 
another beneﬁ t to concentrating ownership of 
these now troubled assets in the hands of our 
GSEs. The FHA, in the meantime, can effect 
mortgage reﬁ nancings much more efﬁ ciently 
than can judges or any new cadre of bank-
ruptcy trustees of the sort some are proposing. 
For again, it is an FHA specialty.
To our detriment we have long since forgotten 
how effective the FHA and its GSE siblings 
were, upon their foundings during the 
Roosevelt era, in ending our last mortgage 
“meltdown.” At literally no ultimate cost to
the public ﬁ sc—none!—they cured that real 
estate crisis, and in so doing transformed us 
from a nation in which fewer than 40 percent 
owned their homes, to a nation in which 
nearly 70 percent do. Since the FHA remains 
both self-funding and best at what it does, 
and since the GSEs have been refederalized in 
keeping with their original, pre-privatization 
mandates, their complementary original 
missions can now be restored. Their man-
dates are clear, are constitutional, and still 
can be more or less costlessly accomplished: 
they exist to spread and maintain nonspecu-
lative home-ownership on Main Street. Let 
them do that now and we’ll save Wall  Street 
—and the global ﬁ nancial system—as well.
At least until the next bubble. ■
Robert C. Hockett is an associate professor at
Cornell Law School.
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Part of the  plan is
simultaneously to
arrange reﬁ nancing 
and ﬁ nancial
counseling, through
the FHA, for those 
mortgagees who are 
now  going under.
